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  • CN 31-2074/F
Volume 34 Issue 5
Oct.  2020
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Article Navigation >  Accounting and Economic Research  > 2020  >  34(5): 41-55
Zhao Liangyu, Lin Ruichen. 2020. Tax Avoidance, Information Asymmetry, and Corporate Information Disclosure. Accounting and Economic Research, 34(5): 41-55.
Citation: Zhao Liangyu, Lin Ruichen. 2020. Tax Avoidance, Information Asymmetry, and Corporate Information Disclosure. Accounting and Economic Research, 34(5): 41-55.
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Tax Avoidance, Information Asymmetry, and Corporate Information Disclosure

  • 1.

    Economics and Management College, Wuhan University, Wuhan Hubei430072, China

  • 2.

    Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, China

  • Received Date: 2020-01-12
  • Publish Date: 2020-09-25
    Abstract
  • Based on the background of increasing corporate tax avoidance activities, this paper examines the impact of tax avoidance on corporate information disclosure behaviors. Tax avoidance tends to bring about the complexity of organizational structure, the concealment of private trading activities and the obscurity of financial reports, which will aggravate the information asymmetry and destroy firm value. In this case, rational managers are motivated to disclose more information to satisfy the needs of external investors for alleviating information asymmetry. Based on the data of China’s listed companies from 2008 to 2017, we find that firms with more aggressive tax planning are more likely to issue voluntary earnings forecasts or provide more precise and accurate estimates under requirement. We further find that good governance mechanism can enhance the management’s motivation for more disclosure. The positive effect of tax avoidance on information disclosure is stronger in firms with higher institutional investors portion. The findings demonstrate that managers try to mitigate negative consequences of aggressive tax avoidance activities through more disclosure.

     

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