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Volume 39 Issue 5
Oct.  2025
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Article Navigation >  Accounting and Economic Research  > 2025  >  39(5): 63-88
Tao Ran, Feng Luya, Liu Feng. 2025. Routine Financial and Accounting Supervision, Information Asymmetry, and Bond Credit Spreads. Accounting and Economic Research, 39(5): 63-88.
Citation: Tao Ran, Feng Luya, Liu Feng. 2025. Routine Financial and Accounting Supervision, Information Asymmetry, and Bond Credit Spreads. Accounting and Economic Research, 39(5): 63-88.
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Routine Financial and Accounting Supervision, Information Asymmetry, and Bond Credit Spreads

  • 1.

    School of Accounting, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang Jiangxi 330013, China

  • 2.

    Accounting Development Research Center, Xiamen University, Xiamen Fujian 361005, China

  • Received Date: 2025-05-09
    Available Online: 2026-05-09
  • Publish Date: 2025-10-20
    Abstract
  • Compared with other securities regulations, financial and accounting supervision targets a broader scope of entities beyond listed companies. This paper takes the bond market, which includes issuers such as listed companies, unlisted state-owned enterprises, and financing platforms, as the research setting to explore the policy effects of routine financial and accounting supervision from the perspective of bond pricing. The result shows that routine financial and accounting supervision significantly reduces the bond credit spreads of issuers in pilot regions, and this effect is limited to bonds issued by unlisted companies, while it is not significant for those issued by listed companies. Mechanism analysis reveals that routine financial and accounting supervision improves the information quality and internal governance of issuers, thereby effectively mitigating the information risk faced by bond investors. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the effect is more pronounced when issuers are more likely to be subject to key supervision, when their information quality and information governance mechanism are weaker, and when bond investors have a higher demand for information. Furthermore, routine financial and accounting supervision exerts real economic effects by helping issuers obtain long-term bond financing, alleviating the maturity mismatch between investment and financing, and increasing long-term real investment. The above evidence indicates that routine financial and accounting supervision plays an important role in facilitating corporate investment and financing activities, providing empirical evidence for financial and accounting supervision to strengthen financial support for the real economy.

     

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