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Volume 39 Issue 5
Oct.  2025
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Article Navigation >  Accounting and Economic Research  > 2025  >  39(5): 119-140
Zhao Le, Wu Shuyi, Dou Chao. 2025. Major Government Customers and Corporate Tax Compliance. Accounting and Economic Research, 39(5): 119-140.
Citation: Zhao Le, Wu Shuyi, Dou Chao. 2025. Major Government Customers and Corporate Tax Compliance. Accounting and Economic Research, 39(5): 119-140.
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Major Government Customers and Corporate Tax Compliance

  • 1.

    Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China

  • 2.

    School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China

  • 3.

    Business School, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China

  • Received Date: 2023-12-03
    Available Online: 2026-05-09
  • Publish Date: 2025-10-20
    Abstract
  • With government as both the collector and user of tax revenues, and firms as major contributors of tax revenues, do major government customers influence corporate tax decision-making? This study uses data on the top five customers disclosed in the annual reports of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019, and explores how firms trade off the economic benefits and monitoring costs associated with major government customers and tax avoidance when making tax decisions in the Chinese institutional setting, that is, the effect of major government customers on corporate tax compliance. The empirical results show that the presence of major government customers significantly reduces firms’ tax avoidance and enhances tax compliance. Moreover, the greater the importance of major government customers, the higher the effective tax rate of firms. Further study finds that stable and long-term relationships with major government customers are more effective in promoting tax compliance, compared with sporadic and occasional government orders. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the positive effect is more pronounced in firms located in areas with stronger tax enforcement, in firms in highly competitive industries, and in non-state-owned enterprises. This paper contributes to the literature on major government customers and tax compliance, and provides practical implications for firms in conducting tax planning and for government authorities in strengthening tax enforcement.

     

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