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  • CN 31-2074/F
Volume 34 Issue 6
Dec.  2020
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Article Navigation >  Accounting and Economic Research  > 2020  >  34(6): 94-111
Song Qinghua, Lin Yongkang. 2020. Manufacturing Leverage, Enterprise Heterogeneityand Banking Systemic Risk. Accounting and Economic Research, 34(6): 94-111.
Citation: Song Qinghua, Lin Yongkang. 2020. Manufacturing Leverage, Enterprise Heterogeneityand Banking Systemic Risk. Accounting and Economic Research, 34(6): 94-111.
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Manufacturing Leverage, Enterprise Heterogeneityand Banking Systemic Risk

  • School of Finance, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan Hubei 430073, China

  • Received Date: 2020-06-28
  • Publish Date: 2020-11-25
    Abstract
  • Financial security is an important foundation for the steady and healthy development of the economy, and preventing and deflating systemic risks is the fundamental task of financial work. Based on the relevant data of 16 listed banks and manufacturing industries in China from 2008 to 2018, this paper conducts an empirical analysis on the relationship among manufacturing leverage, corporate heterogeneity and banking systemic risk. The results show that: First, manufacturing leverage has a significantly positive impact on bank systemic risks, but the transmission mechanism is not single and complex. Second, there is obvious corporate heterogeneity in the impact of manufacturing leverage on bank systemic risk, which is mainly manifested in a large difference in the way and transmission path of the overall leverage ratio of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises on bank systemic risk. Third, the bank liquidity supervision indicators alleviate the adverse impact of manufacturing leverage on bank systemic risks to a certain extent, and this mitigation effect is mainly manifested in state-owned enterprises. To this end, we should strengthen the source governance of bank systemic risks, promote manufacturing enterprises to reduce debt leverage, and promote the orderly and appropriate transfer of debt leverage from non-financial corporate sectors to government and residential sectors, so as to better achieve overall manufacturing transformation and upgrading and the healthy and stable development of the financial system.

     

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