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  • CN 31-2074/F
Volume 39 Issue 2
Apr.  2025
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Article Navigation >  Accounting and Economic Research  > 2025  >  39(2): 3-27
Chu Jian, Liang Qinglin. 2025. Practice Makes True Knowledge: The Rotation System of Chief Accountants and Market Value Stability of State-Owned Enterprises. Accounting and Economic Research, 39(2): 3-27.
Citation: Chu Jian, Liang Qinglin. 2025. Practice Makes True Knowledge: The Rotation System of Chief Accountants and Market Value Stability of State-Owned Enterprises. Accounting and Economic Research, 39(2): 3-27.
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Practice Makes True Knowledge: The Rotation System of Chief Accountants and Market Value Stability of State-Owned Enterprises

  • School of Business, Nanjing University, Nanjing Jiangsu 210093, China

  • Received Date: 2023-11-03
  • Accepted Date: 2025-02-25
    • Available Online: 2025-11-25
  • Publish Date: 2025-04-25
    Abstract
  • The executive rotation system plays an important role in strengthening national economic governance and modernization. Although learning by doing is theoretically regarded as an important underlying mechanism, there is still a lack of systematic and consistent empirical evidence. Against the backdrop of the rotation system of chief accountants vigorously promoted in recent years by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), this paper examines the governance effect and mechanism of chief accountant rotation on the market value stability of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from a micro perspective. The study finds that the rotation of chief accountants significantly reduces the stock price crash risk of SOEs, and this governance effect is more pronounced when SOEs face more severe information asymmetry and principal-agent problems. Mechanism tests show that the governance effect of chief accountant rotation does not operate through enhancing their independence in performing duties, but primarily through promoting learning by doing. Specifically, the more rotation experiences and the longer rotation duration of chief accountants, the stronger the governance effect. Furthermore, the more severe the information asymmetry and principal-agent problems in the new SOEs compared to the original SOEs before chief accountants assume office, the stronger the effect of rotation on improving the information environment, reducing agency costs, and suppressing stock price crash risk in the new SOEs. Further tests reveal that alternative explanations based on incentive changes induced by rotation are not supported, while market-based mechanisms in the capital market, such as investor participation, analyst coverage, and short-selling deregulation, have a substitutive effect on the governance role of chief accountant rotation. In summary, the rotation system of chief accountants helps accumulate human capital of chief accountants, thereby optimizing SOE governance and effectively maintaining the market value stability of SOEs.

     

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