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  • ISSN 2096-9554
  • CN 31-2074/F
Volume 34 Issue 4
Nov.  2020
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Zhang Qingjun, Ma Hongliang, Yue Yuan. 2020. Monetary Policy and Bank Systemic Risk Preventionfrom the Perspective of Leverage Ratio. Accounting and Economic Research, 34(4): 96-114.
Citation: Zhang Qingjun, Ma Hongliang, Yue Yuan. 2020. Monetary Policy and Bank Systemic Risk Preventionfrom the Perspective of Leverage Ratio. Accounting and Economic Research, 34(4): 96-114.

Monetary Policy and Bank Systemic Risk Preventionfrom the Perspective of Leverage Ratio

  • Received Date: 2019-12-05
  • Publish Date: 2020-07-25
  • Based on the panel data of Chinese listed commercial banks from 2010 to 2018, this paper analyzes the impact of monetary policy on bank systemic risks from the perspective of leverage ratio, and conducts an empirical test on the banking leverage mechanism in which monetary policy affects bank systemic risks. The results show that both conventional and unconventional monetary policies have a positive correlation with bank leverage. Loose monetary policy will increase bank leverage. Increasing bank leverage will significantly increase bank systemic risks. The leverage mechanism in which monetary policy affects the bank systemic risks is effective. The effect of monetary policy on bank systemic risks increases with the increase of bank leverage, and this effect shows a non-linear threshold characteristic. Finally, it is recommended that the regulatory authorities consider the leverage mechanism of monetary policy affecting systemic risks in the context of macro-prudential supervision, give full play to the role of monetary policy to maintain financial stability, and improve the “two-pillar” regulatory framework for monetary policy and macro-prudential policy.

     

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