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Volume 34 Issue 5
Oct.  2020
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Article Navigation >  Accounting and Economic Research  > 2020  >  34(5): 56-67
Lyu Xuejing, Chen Zhibin, Li Dongyang, Wang Shiyu. 2020. Government Regulation and Financial Risk of Enterprises: Empirical Evidence from A-share Listed Companies in China. Accounting and Economic Research, 34(5): 56-67.
Citation: Lyu Xuejing, Chen Zhibin, Li Dongyang, Wang Shiyu. 2020. Government Regulation and Financial Risk of Enterprises: Empirical Evidence from A-share Listed Companies in China. Accounting and Economic Research, 34(5): 56-67.
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Government Regulation and Financial Risk of Enterprises: Empirical Evidence from A-share Listed Companies in China

  • 1.

    Business School, Nanjing University, Nanjing Jiangsu 210093, China

  • 2.

    School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing Jiangsu 210096, China

  • 3.

    Dongwu School of Business，Soochow University，Suzhou Jiangsu 215006，China

  • Received Date: 2020-02-01
  • Publish Date: 2020-09-25
    Abstract
  • Based on A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2016 to 2018, this paper mainly examines the impact of government regulation on financial risk of enterprises from two perspectives of the force and the mode of government regulation. Through the empirical test of the establishment of multiple linear regression analysis model, the paper finds that the government regulation has a significant impact on the financial risk of enterprises. Based on the current regulatory environment in China, the stronger the force of government regulation, the smaller the financial risk of enterprises, and the impact of government regulation on financial risk of enterprises varies with the ways the government acts, and the impact of economic regulation on financial risk of enterprises is more significant than that of social regulation. The empirical results provide theoretical reference and empirical evidence for China’s economic regulation reform and how enterprises cope with financial risks in different regulatory environments.

     

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