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Volume 39 Issue 1
Feb.  2025
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Article Navigation >  Accounting and Economic Research  > 2025  >  39(1): 44-65
Wan Hualin, Feng Fan, Zhao Shan. 2025. Equity Incentives Under Dual-Class Equity Agency Conflicts: A Perspective of the Relational Contracts. Accounting and Economic Research, 39(1): 44-65.
Citation: Wan Hualin, Feng Fan, Zhao Shan. 2025. Equity Incentives Under Dual-Class Equity Agency Conflicts: A Perspective of the Relational Contracts. Accounting and Economic Research, 39(1): 44-65.
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Equity Incentives Under Dual-Class Equity Agency Conflicts: A Perspective of the Relational Contracts

  • 1.

    School of Accounting, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai 201620, China

  • 2.

    School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China

  • 3.

    Lab for Low-carbon Intelligent Governance (LLIG), Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China

  • 4.

    Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong 999077, China

  • Received Date: 2023-11-30
    Available Online: 2025-05-27
  • Publish Date: 2025-02-25
    Abstract
  • Based on the theoretical analysis of dual-class equity agency conflicts, this study employs the Difference-in-Differences(DID) method to empirically examine changes in related-party transactions before and after the equity incentive implementation in listed firms. The findings reveal that firms experience a significant increase in related-party transactions post-equity incentive implementation, primarily driven by abnormal related-party transactions and non-market-priced related-party transactions, which consequently leads to decreased persistence of such transactions. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the increase in related-party transactions is particularly pronounced in state-owned enterprises, those adopting stock option incentives, and firms with superior historical performance, indicating that relational contracts, incentive mechanisms, and appropriable rents significantly influence controlling shareholders’ tunneling behaviors. The results demonstrate that while equity incentives serve to mitigate principal-agent conflicts between management and shareholders, thereby reducing Type I agency costs, they may concurrently induce or intensify controlling shareholders’ expropriation of minority interests, leading to an increase in Type II agency costs.

     

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