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Volume 39 Issue 6
Dec.  2025
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Article Navigation >  Accounting and Economic Research  > 2025  >  39(6): 133-155
Zhu Zhu, Tang Xiaojian, Lin Bin. 2025. Can Standardizing Tax Enforcement Discretion Promote Corporate Innovation? A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on Benchmarks for Administrative Penalty Discretion in Taxation. Accounting and Economic Research, 39(6): 133-155.
Citation: Zhu Zhu, Tang Xiaojian, Lin Bin. 2025. Can Standardizing Tax Enforcement Discretion Promote Corporate Innovation? A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on Benchmarks for Administrative Penalty Discretion in Taxation. Accounting and Economic Research, 39(6): 133-155.
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Can Standardizing Tax Enforcement Discretion Promote Corporate Innovation? A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on Benchmarks for Administrative Penalty Discretion in Taxation

  • 1.

    College of Finance, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing Jiangsu 210095, China

  • 2.

    Business School, Shantou University, Shantou Guangdong 515800, China

  • Received Date: 2024-05-09
    Available Online: 2026-06-26
  • Publish Date: 2025-12-20
    Abstract
  • From the perspective of tax enforcement discretion, this paper selects the gradual implementation of tax enforcement discretion benchmarks across various regions in China starting from 2016 as an exogenous shock, constructing a quasi-natural experiment to examine the impact of standardizing tax enforcement discretion on corporate innovation. The results show that the standardization of tax enforcement discretion significantly promotes corporate innovation, and this positive effect is more pronounced in firms with lower internal control quality and higher levels of collusion between taxpayers and tax authorities. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the above effect is stronger for firms with higher tax avoidance levels and greater analyst coverage. Economic consequence analysis further shows that the standardization of tax enforcement discretion enhances the firm value of companies with higher innovation levels. These findings extend the existing literature on corporate innovation and tax enforcement, and offer practical implications for improving the quality of corporate innovation decisions.

     

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